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1. Introduction
This paper explores an intuitive theory of invoicing for exporting firms,
and then examines some new data on invoicing for the European Union
accession countries. The paper makes a nice contribution to our under-
standing of invoicing practices. My comments are divided into two sec-
tions. In the first, I make some observations about the invoicing theory
presented in the paper. In the second, I discuss the application of the
theory to the data.
2. The Theory
The model presented in the paper is developed fully in Goldberg and
Tille (2005) (hereinafter referred to as GT). The model builds on some
work of my own (Devereux, Engel, and Storgaard 2004; Engel 2005), as
well as work of Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2005), so my critique of the
model applies to my work as well. All of these models are essentially
static models that examine the price setting decision of a monopolistic
firm that must set a price without knowledge of the realizations of vari-
ous stochastic variables (exchange rates, and other variables that affect
demand for its product). The expected discounted profits of the firm
are affected by the currency in which prices are set. The goal of these
papers is to examine the factors that determine which currency is opti-
mal—the currency in which the firm incurs its costs, the currency of the
importer, or some other currency.
The GT model assumes firms can index their export price to a basket
of currencies, and determines the optimal weights on the firm's own
currency, the importer's currency, and a vehicle currency. They refer to
a "hedging" and a "herding" motive, which Goldberg nicely explains
in this paper.Comment 395
The terminology, however, may be a bit misleading. The firms in
this model act as if they are risk neutral. That is, under the assump-
tions of the model, the decision of the firm is equivalent to maximizing
expected profits. Firms do care how much their profits could fluctuate
across states, but that is because the profit function is not linear in all
variables. The desirability of having prices set in the producer's cur-
rency or some other currency depends on the shape of the profit func-
tion, as Giovannini (1988) and Bachetta and van Wincoop (2005) have
explained. The model in this paper assumes that demand has constant
elasticity, and costs are increasing, but the results do not carry over to
more general settings.
A different set-up would allow firms to be genuinely risk averse.
Firms in the model of this paper discount expected profits, but the dis-
count factor is assumed to be exogenous to the firm. That is, the deci-
sions of the firm do not affect the level of the discount factor in any state.
As Engel (2005) explains: "Firm owners might be risk averse, so D [the
discount factor] could be the marginal utility of an increment to profit
denominated in the currency of the exporter." In short, this objective for
the firm holds under a variety of possible assumptions about the objec-
tives of the firm managers and the structure of asset markets and pos-
sibilities for hedging. The assumption that D is exogenous to the firm
does rule out some possibilities, however. Suppose a single household
owns the firm, and the owner-manager discounts profits by marginal
utility. The outcome for the firm might directly affect the level of con-
sumption of the owner, and thus the marginal utility. The assumption
that D is exogenous to the firm would be violated. An exogenous dis-
count factor is more sensible when, for example, there are many owners
of the firm, and there are many other sources of income for each owner.
Thus our assumption of an exogenous discount factor is violated in the
models of Feenstra and Kendall (1997) and the model of risk-averse firm
owners in Friberg (1998), who assume in essence that firm owners' only
income is from profits (so that the firm maximizes the expected utility
of profits). It may be that in modeling the decisions of many exporters
in accession countries, the assumption of an exogenous discount factor
is not the most plausible one. Modeling the price setting decision under
genuine risk aversion may make more sense.
All of these models abstract, however, from what must be one of the
most important determinants of the currency of pricing, which is the
cost to the firms of setting prices in different currencies. The underlying
assumption of modern models of price stickiness is that it is costly to
set a price. The costs of price setting must increase if the firm sets the396 Engel
price in many different currencies. That is, local currency pricing might
be costly if firms export to many markets.
From many casual conversations I have had with businesspeople,
as well as from a little survey I did a couple of years ago of Wiscon-
sin-based exporters, I believe that these cost considerations do weigh
heavily in the decision of the currency of price setting. Many small U.S.
firms price only in dollars because it is too costly to figure out how to
set prices in other currencies. Often these firms sell their product to dis-
tributors who may set a price in a different currency for export.
Those firms that maintain non-dollar price lists may set prices in only
one or two other currencies. Typically these firms price in a foreign cur-
rency if a foreign market represents a large part of their sales. I interpret
this to mean that there are fixed costs to setting prices, so that firms
maintain a foreign currency price list only for large export markets.
These cost considerations may help explain why markets settle on a
vehicle currency for setting prices. And, it may explain why so many
firms that export to the U.S. set prices in dollars—because the U.S. mar-
ket is large.
3. Application of the Theory to the Data
This paper considers a model of a firm, but it examines aggregate data
on the fraction of export prices from a number of countries invoiced in
various currencies. The data do not allow us to ask how an individual
firm's decision changes when it is faced with different states. The data
can only be described with an equilibrium model.
Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2005) show that multiple equilibria are
possible in a setting that is a special case of the model considered here.
If multiple equilibria are possible, then without a mechanism to choose
among equilibria, the model can only predict features of the data that
are common to all of the equilibria. Is there a way for choosing among
equilibria? The answer might be related to the cost considerations noted
above. Future work in this area might fruitfully examine the costs of
changing prices, rather than taking as given that prices must be set in
some currency (or some basket of currencies).
The empirical section puts a lot of emphasis on the currency of invoic-
ing for goods that are traded in exchange markets. But the model does
not apply to those types of goods. The model is one in which firms set
prices in advance of shocks to exchange rates, and then sell whatever
is demanded at the price they set. That is not a good description ofComment 397
the pricing in organized exchanges. Those prices are just as flexible as
exchange rates.
It is not even clear to me that the model applies to those goods that
are "reference priced/' although I do not know the details of these mar-
kets. If prices are published in catalogs, then it does seem like prices
are sticky. But then do firms have price setting power, as the model
assumes? Do these markets really work like the model, so that buyers
accept the price that is listed and simply demand as much as they want
at that price?
It would be helpful if the paper were explicit on exactly what "invoic-
ing" means in the data. Do these statistical agencies actually look at
invoices and write down what currency is used? The model determines
what currency prices are set in. That is, in the model, the price is set in
some currency and cannot change (presumably for some time) when
there are shocks. Is this the same thing as the currency of invoicing?
Can't a firm set its price in dollars but write its invoice in euros? Is there
any evidence that this does not happen very much?
4. Conclusions
I view my comments here as suggestions for the direction of future
research. I do not want to minimize the contribution of this paper,
and the work it builds on by Goldberg and Tille (2005). I will close by
emphasizing what I believe to be the main contribution of these papers:
they take somewhat abstract theory of the currency of price setting, and
rework it into a form that can be compared to data; the papers present
unique data on invoicing from a large number of countries; and then
they test some of the implications of the models against this data. All of
this is novel, and a step forward.
Note
1. The revised version of Engel (2005) in turn benefited greatly from my reading of
Goldberg and Tille (2005).
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